ANOTHER KUWAITI DIRTY TRICK

Malcom Lagauche
October 29, 2007

Most people blame Iraq for the August 2, 1990 military actions against Kuwait. George Bush I quickly lambasted Iraq and world public opinion considered Kuwait the aggrieved party in the conflict.

In reality, the Iraqis ran into an ambush that began long before August 2, 1990. During the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait was already dealing with the U.S. in concocting plans to undermine the Iraqi economy. After the cease-fire, the shenanigans of Kuwait and the U.S. went into high gear.

Shortly after the Iraqis crossed the border with Kuwait, they came across documents showing collusion to harm Iraq’s economy and keep the country servile for years to come. Below is a letter sent on November 22, 1989 from Brigadier Fahd Ahmed Al Fahd to Sheikh Salem Al Sabah, the Kuwaiti Minister of the Interior. Tariq Aziz sent copies of this letter to the United Nations on October 24, 1990. It gained little fanfare because the U.S. had already smeared Iraq’s reputation and no one wanted to contradict the U.S. propaganda. The letter shows that Kuwait was working hard to injure Iraq at the time of the August 2, 1990 invasion.

On July 28, 1990, King Hussein of Jordan spoke with Sheikh Sabah, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister. King Hussein was perplexed at Kuwait’s attitude and he told the Foreign Minister about his concern that Iraq may take military action. The Sheikh’s response was curious because Iraq had not invaded Kuwait yet and the U.S. proclaimed it had no defense agreement with Kuwait. Sheikh Sabah told King Hussein:

We cannot bargain over an inch of territory. It’s against our constitution. If Saddam comes across the border, let him come. The Americans will get him out.

Sheikh Sabah’s response was the first inclication that U.S./Kuwait relations may have been much more advanced than thought. The following letter proves this assessment.

_____________________________________________

Top Secret and Private

His Excellency Sheikh Salem Al Sabah, Minister of the Interior.

In accordance with Your Highness’s orders, as given during our meeting with you on October 22, 1989, I visited the headquarters of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, together with Colonel Ishaq Abd Al Hadi Shaddad, Director of investigations for the Governorate of Ahmadi, from November 12 to 18, 1989. The United States emphasized that the visit should be top secret in order not to arouse sensibilities among our brothers in the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran and Iraq.

I hereby inform Your Highness of the most important elements of what was agreed with Judge William Webster, Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, in the course of my private meeting with him on Tuesday, November 14, 1989.

1. The United States is undertaking to train individuals selected by us to protect His Highness the Emir and His Highness Sheikh Saad Al Abdullah Al Salem Al Sabah. The instruction and training is to take place at the headquarters of the United States Intelligence Agency itself, and we have set their numbers at 128, some of whom are to be used for special missions with the royal family, as determined by His Highness the Crown Prince. In this connection the United States side informed us of its dissatisfaction with the performance of the Royal Guard forces at the time of the criminal attack on His Highness the Emir.

2. We agreed with the United States side that visits would be exchanged at all levels between the State Security Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, and that information would be exchanged about the armaments and social and political structures of Iran and Iraq.

3. We sought assistance from Agency experts in reviewing the structure of the State Security Department, which, according to the instructions given by His Highness the Emir, was to be accorded major priority at our meeting with the United States side. This would involve use of their expertise in drawing up a new strategy for action commensurate with the changes in the Gulf region and the country’s internal situation, by developing a computer system and automating functions in the State Security Department.

4. The United States side said it was entirely willing to meet our request for an exchange of information concerning the activities of Shia groups in the country and certain States of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Mr. Webster applauded our measures to combat movements in Iran and said that the Agency was willing to take joint steps to eliminate points of tension in the Gulf region.

5. We agreed with the American side that it was important to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to put pressure on that country’s government to delineate our common border. The Central Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate means of pressure, saying that broad cooperation should be initiated between us, on condition that such activities are coordinated at a high level.

6. The United States side is of the opinion that our relations with Iran should be conducted in such a way as, on the one hand, to avoid contact with that country, and on the other, to exert all possible economic pressure on it and to concentrate on effectively bolstering its alliance with Syria. The agreement with the United States side provides that Kuwait will avoid negative statements about Iran and restrict its efforts to influencing that country at Arab meetings.

7. We agreed with the United States side that it was important to combat drugs in the country, after Central Intelligence Agency narcotics experts informed us that much Kuwaiti capital is being used to promote drug trafficking in Pakistan and Iran, and that the spread of such trafficking will have negative consequences for the future of Kuwait.

8. The United States side placed a special telephone at our disposal to promote the rapid exchange of views and information that do not require written communications. The number of the telephone, which is Mr. Webster’s private line is,.


Article nr. 37637 sent on 29-oct-2007 04:22 ECT


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